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NO. 41 AUGUST 2020 Introduction 
Russia’s “Passportisation” of the Donbas 
The Mass Naturalisation of Ukrainians Is More Than a Foreign Policy Tool 
Fabian Burkhardt 
Russia has so far issued almost 200,000 Russian passports to Ukrainians from the 
“People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. This undermines the Minsk peace 
process. The passportisation of the Donbas is part of a tried and tested set of foreign 
policy instruments. Russia is deliberately making it more difficult to resolve territo-
rial conflicts in the post-Soviet space by creating controlled instability. This demon-
strative intervention in state sovereignty exerts pressure on the Ukrainian central 
government in Kyiv. Domestically, Russia’s goal is to counteract its own natural popu-
lation decline through immigration. Because of the war in eastern Ukraine, more and 
more Ukrainians have migrated to Russia; this was one of the reasons behind Russia 
revising its migration strategy in 2018. The liberalisation of citizenship legislation 
was aimed particularly at Ukraine. By delaying any resolution to the conflict, Russia 
achieves two objectives simultaneously: it retains permanent influence on Ukraine via 
the Donbas, and it becomes more attractive to many Ukrainians as a destination for 
emigration. 
 
Five years after the proclamation of the 
separatist “People’s Republics” of Donetsk 
and Luhansk in spring 2014, Russia decided 
to add an additional element to its military, 
political, economic and diplomatic support 
for the two secession territories in eastern 
Ukraine, an element which it considers 
“humanitarian” in nature. Since April 2019, 
residents of the separatist-controlled parts 
of these two regions can become Russian 
citizens via a simplified procedure. This fast 
track was made possible by a presidential 
decree issued by Vladimir Putin, which 
accelerated the naturalisation process from 
at least eight years to under three months. 
Russia stresses that its passport initiative 
has humanitarian motives, intended to 
facilitate the life and mobility of those who 
do not have a Ukrainian passport or cannot 
renew it. At the same time, Moscow claims 
that it is a purely “practical measure” that 
does not contradict the Minsk Protocol on 
the pacification of eastern Ukraine. How-
ever, the then Ukrainian Foreign Minister, 
Pavlo Klimkin, categorised passportisation 
as a violation of state sovereignty and a 
further step in the “occupation” of his 
country. In its conclusions of 20 June 2019, 
the European Council noted that passporti-
sation is contrary to both “the spirit and the 
objectives” of the Minsk Protocol. In Octo-
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ber 2019, the EU Commission issued a 
guidance to create the basis for the non-
recognition of such passports by its member 
states. 
Two circumstances suggest that Russia 
wants to secure permanent influence over 
the two separatist territories without direct-
ly seeking annexation: previous cases of 
passportisation – defined as mass extra-
territorial naturalisation – in secession 
territories in Abkhazia, South Ossetia (both 
Georgia) and Transnistria (Republic of 
Moldova); and extraterritorial implementa-
tion by the Migration Department of the 
Russian Ministry of the Interior, which has 
established a cross-border infrastructure for 
passportisation of the Donbas area. In reali-
ty, Russia’s aim is to torpedo any resolution 
of the conflict. 
The passportisation decree was published 
alongside a second presidential decree, 
which allows accelerated naturalisation for 
Ukrainians from the Donbas who have a 
Russian residence permit. Moscow readjust-
ed its migration policy in 2019 and 2020. 
The Donbas conflict area serves as a source 
of migration for counteracting, in the long 
term, both Russia’s population decline and 
shortages in its labour market. 
Timing: Ukrainian 
Presidential Elections 
Launching passportisation in the middle of 
the Ukrainian presidential election cam-
paign was a deliberate move to put the 
future Ukrainian president under pressure 
from the outset. In the first round, on 31 
March 2019, political newcomer Volodymyr 
Zelensky (30.24 per cent) was clearly ahead 
of incumbent Petro Poroshenko (15.95 per 
cent). In the runoff on April 21, challenger 
Zelensky scored a landslide victory with 
73 per cent of the vote. 
It is noteworthy that Zelensky won all 
the constituencies in eastern Ukraine in 
which Yuri Boyko, considered a pro-Russian 
candidate, had the upper hand in the first 
round (see Map 1). In the election cam-
paign, Zelensky had adopted a more con-
ciliatory tone towards the “People’s Repub-
lics” than the incumbent president. Peace 
and reintegration were declared goals in 
Zelensky’s election programme. The 
Kremlin therefore had to assume that the 
ex-TV comedian would enjoy more legiti-
macy in eastern Ukraine than the hardliner 
Poroshenko. Although no elections were 
held in the secession territories, Zelensky’s 
electoral success might locally have radi-
ated to the “People’s Republics” at least to 
some degree, and thus undermined Russia’s 
authority there. 
Simplified Naturalisation Is Also 
Motivated by Demographics 
On 24 April 2019, only three days after the 
Ukrainian election runoff, the Kremlin 
published Decree No. 183, allowing simpli-
fied naturalisation for those with perma-
nent residence in the Donbas territories 
that are not under the control of the Ukrai-
nian central government (non-government 
controlled areas, NGCA; see Map 2, page 5). 
Proof of residence must be provided using 
identity documents issued by the “People’s 
Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk; Russia 
has recognised them since February 2017. 
On 29 April Putin extended the circle of 
people entitled to the simplified procedure 
in a second decree (No. 187). Since then, the 
procedure has also applied to those who 
had their residence on the present territory 
of the two “People’s Republics” before they 
were proclaimed in April 2014 and who are 
in possession of documents that allow them 
to stay in the Russian Federation. Finally, in 
mid-July, Decree No. 343 extended the regu-
lations on the original place of residence 
contained in Decree No. 187. From now on, 
the entire Donetsk and Luhansk regions, i.e. 
including those territories that were or are 
under the control of the Ukrainian central 
government (GCAs), are considered the 
original place of residence. 
According to the Russian migration 
authorities, in 2019 more than 136,000 
inhabitants of the “People’s Republics” of 
Donetsk and Luhansk and another 60,000 
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people from the Donbas (GCA) received 
Russian citizenship via the new fast-track 
procedure. By mid-June 2020, more than 
180,000 new citizens from the “People’s 
Republics” had already been granted Rus-
sian citizenship. Although the bureaucratic 
process is identical in both cases, only the 
first decree, which allows for mass extra-
territorial naturalisation, can be understood 
as passportisation. The second decree is 
aimed at people from the Donbas who have 
migrated to Russia before and have expres-
sed an interest in settling there permanent-
ly by formalising their residence status, but 
who previously had no prospect of speedy 
naturalisation due to bureaucratic hurdles. 
Underpinning the liberalisation of 
Russia’s citizenship policy is its demograph-
ic change. At the beginning of 2020, the 
population of Russia was 146.7 million. 
Since 2016 its natural population decline 
has been steadily worsening. In 2019 the 
difference between births and deaths rose 
to 316,000. Pessimistic scenarios by the 
United Nations assume that the population 
could shrink to between 135.8 and 124.6 
million by 2050. Both the Action Plan for 
Demographic Policy and the new catalogue 
of measures for migration policy published 
in 2018, envisage that this natural popu-
lation decline will be offset by migration 
growth and fast-track naturalisation, with 
a target of 300,000 new citizens per year. 
Ukrainians play a prominent role in this 
strategy. From the perspective of the Rus-
sian state, they represent almost ideal mi-
grants. As Eastern Slavs, they are considered 
easy to integrate; they bring the necessary 
skills for the Russian labour market; and 
they show great willingness to emigrate due 
Map 1 
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to the ongoing territorial conflict and low 
levels of income in their country of origin. 
After the outbreak of war in 2014, it proved 
bureaucratically difficult to transfer Ukrai-
nian refugees and forced migrants from 
temporary asylum in Russia to permanent 
residence status or even citizenship. Under 
a regional quota system, preference was 
given to those who had qualifications in 
demand on the labour market. The Russian 
state programme, which is meant to pro-
mote the resettlement of compatriots, also 
proved to be of limited suitability for Ukrai-
nians, since it is subject to numerous 
conditions (age, professional qualifications, 
region of settlement). 
Putin’s passport decrees had an immedi-
ate effect: the number of naturalisations 
rose from 269,362 in 2018 to 497,817 in 
2019, and the proportion of Ukrainians 
doubled from around 30 to 60 per cent. On 
17 April 2020, President Putin signed 
another law that makes it much easier for 
applicants from Belarus, Moldova, Kazakh-
stan and Ukraine in particular to apply for 
citizenship. Under the updated legislation, 
Russian citizenship policy is driven not 
only by geopolitical and nationalistic mo-
tives, but also by the short- and medium-
term needs of the labour market and long-
term demographic considerations. 
Passportisation of Secession 
Areas: A Comparison 
Passportisation is a Russian foreign policy 
instrument for dealing with territorial 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Previous 
instances, however, do not allow any clear 
conclusions to be drawn as to what objec-
tive Russia might be pursuing in the Don-
bas. Initially, there were fears that Russia 
was distributing passports prior to a milita-
ry intervention to protect its citizens – 
as in South Ossetia, where Russia was trying 
to implement the “Responsibility to Pro-
tect” doctrine. Neither this fear nor that of 
an annexation of the “People’s Republics” 
has so far been validated. Nevertheless, 
either scenario is possible if the Minsk pro-
cess fails or the conflict escalates again 
militarily. 
Russia does not pursue a uniform strate-
gy for passportisation. Rather, the Kremlin 
adapts its foreign policy instruments to the 
specific circumstances of the secession 
area concerned and to its own, sometimes 
changing, objectives. In Transnistria, for 
example, passportisation began in 2002, 
long after the hot phase of the territorial 
conflict; currently, some 220,000 inhabit-
ants (44 per cent) hold a Russian passport. 
Two similarities can nevertheless be dis-
cerned. First, passportisation is normally 
considered a violation of international law. 
This was the conclusion reached by the 
Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia in its 
detailed report. The director of the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law in Heidelberg, Anne 
Peters, considers the passportisation of the 
Donbas to be an abuse of rights by Russia. 
Second, Russia’s extraterritorial naturali-
sation practice demonstrates a dual under-
standing of state sovereignty. While Russia 
claims inviolability of state sovereignty for 
the international state system and especial-
ly for itself, in its eyes post-Soviet states 
have at best limited sovereignty. This atti-
tude is manifest in the cross-border infra-
structure for the passportisation of the Don-
bas (see Map 2). The Russian Ministry of the 
Interior has set up migration offices in the 
Rostov region specifically to process fast-
track applications; it has requested addition-
al funds in the 2020-2022 budget for equip-
ment and special payments to the clerks. 
While passport applications are made in 
the “People’s Republics” themselves, pass-
ports for those who are not members of the 
military or security services are issued ex-
clusively in the Rostov region. The “People’s 
Republics” have put in place long-distance 
bus lines to make it easier for people to 
collect their new passports. According to 
official statistics, the Rostov region alone 
issued over 160,000 passports in 2019. 
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Secession Conflict and Pass-
portisation as Gerrymandering: 
Consequences for the Minsk 
Process 
The annexation of Crimea and the war in 
eastern Ukraine have profoundly changed 
the country’s electoral geography. 3.75 
million voters, or 12 percent of those who 
voted in the 2010 presidential elections, are 
affected, meaning that the war has also 
changed the regions’ relative electoral 
importance. The east and south have lost 
power, the centre and west have gained 
accordingly. Simultaneously, regional dif-
ferences have become less significant, since 
a large proportion of those who voted for 
pro-Russian, communist or strongly re-
gional candidates or parties are no longer 
eligible to vote. 
In the meantime, this shift in electoral 
geography, fuelled by the conflict, has 
made Ukraine much more homogeneous 
than before, for example in terms of Ukrai-
nians regarding the country as their home-
land or rejecting a customs union with 
Russia. 
Map 2 
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The changed electoral geography also 
affects the incentive systems of the conflict 
parties. Russia’s strategic goal is to exert 
long-term political influence on Ukraine 
and prevent its deeper integration with the 
European Union (EU) and NATO. An un-
frozen conflict or a reintegration of the 
“People’s Republics” under the conditions 
of the Minsk Protocol is more advantageous 
than two independent mini-states or anoth-
er two Russian federal regions. For Ukraine, 
the establishment of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty is a top priority. However, 
every member of the Kyiv central govern-
ment is aware that a reintegration of the 
Donbas would entail the readmission of 
hundreds of thousands of voters who, un-
like the voters in the rest of Ukraine, are 
likely to be more critical of Kyiv and more 
sympathetic to Russia. 
President Zelensky’s public warnings 
that a “Plan B” needs to be implemented, 
which he has been making repeatedly since 
October 2019, must also be seen in this con-
text. Although the details of this “Plan B” 
have never been spelled out, it is likely to 
be a turning away from the Minsk process 
and thus from reintegration, which would 
mean temporarily or definitively rejecting 
the NGCAs. Despite Russia and Ukraine 
signing the “Steinmeier formula” on Octo-
ber 1, 2019, their contradictory interpre-
tations persist: Russia insists on a literal 
implementation of the Minsk Protocol, 
whereas security guarantees are key for 
Ukraine. 
As a vital component of peace agree-
ments, elections normally increase the like-
lihood that hostilities will not flare up 
again after the conflict has ended. However, 
premature elections in secession areas also 
carry risks. Former rebel parties often gar-
ner huge advantages, and elections can 
serve as catalysts for destructive competi-
tion and hate speech, which in turn can 
lead to violent clashes and, in the long 
term, prevent peace and democratisation. 
The close integration of political and mili-
tary structures in the NGCAs already poses 
an immense challenge for conducting elec-
tions. For several reasons, passportisation 
exacerbates this problem, which particular-
ly affects the local elections set out in the 
Minsk Protocol. 
First, the distribution of passports ob-
structs the negotiation process. Thus, at the 
meeting of the Permanent Council of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) on 21 May 2020, the 
Ukrainian representative presented the Rus-
sian passports of the head of the “People’s 
Republic of Donetsk”, Denys Pushylin, and 
the “Foreign Ministers” of the two “People’s 
Republics”. These passports, he claimed, 
were evidence that Russia nominates offi-
cials who represent Russia, but not the local 
population. 
Second, passportisation creates potential 
for division in Ukraine. Whilst its leaders 
agree that the passports distributed by Rus-
sia are not legal and therefore invalid, there 
is no consensus as to what specific steps the 
country should take in response. Hardliners 
have proposed withdrawing Ukrainian citi-
zenship, pensions and other social benefits, 
or even criminal prosecution by the prose-
cutor general’s office. These proposals have 
so far remained a rhetorical threat. On 
19 May 2020, the issue of passportisation 
also defeated a bill on the liberalisation of 
citizenship, which Zelensky had introduced 
in December 2019. For critics, the introduc-
tion of dual citizenship would not only con-
tradict Article 4 of the Ukrainian constitu-
tion, but it could also provide a gateway for 
Russian influence after reintegration, for 
example if Russian passport-holders resi-
dent in the former NGCAs were to stand for 
election to the Ukrainian Rada. 
Third, passportisation is at odds with the 
local elections to be held under Point 4 of 
the Minsk Protocol. The current ban on 
dual citizenship would not allow citizens of 
the “People’s Republics” to stand for elec-
tion or hold office in state or local govern-
ments if they have a Russian as well as a 
Ukrainian passport. Since Russian passpor-
tisation is primarily aimed at members of 
the civil and military administration, those 
working in the medical and education sec-
tor and de-facto-state-owned enterprises, 
this would preclude tens of thousands from 
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being able to exercise their right to stand 
for election, or taking up state posts in a 
reintegrated Donbas. In fact, it would result 
in widespread lustration, which neither the 
amnesty set out in the Minsk Protocol nor 
local elections according to OSCE standards 
allow for, and would be detrimental to a 
longer-term resolution to the conflict. 
Fourth, passportisation intensifies the 
gerrymandering caused by the war, i.e. the 
manipulation of borders and constituency 
composition. In everyday life, which is 
marked by death, forced migration and ex-
pulsion, passportisation creates incentives. 
It facilitates permanent settlement in Rus-
sia for Ukrainians who already have a resi-
dence permit there and will make it easier 
for Ukrainians living in the NGCAs to enter 
the Russian labour market. By contrast, for 
those who are socially vulnerable and less 
mobile, such as parents of several children 
or pensioners, their Russian passport has so 
far only had symbolic value. It does not 
provide automatic entitlement to a Russian 
pension or state benefits such as child bene-
fit (“maternity capital” for two or more 
children), since these require proof of being 
registered in Russia or additional conditions 
– which the vast majority of people living 
in the Donbas do not meet even after natu-
ralisation. 
The NGCAs are thus losing not only 
people who have relatives in Russia, but in 
particular residents of working age and 
with professions that are in demand on the 
Russian labour market. In October 2019, a 
population census was held in the NGCAs 
for the first time, the results of which have 
not yet been published. It is estimated that 
2 million people live there, about half as 
many as officially stated (3.7 million). Little 
is known about their socio-demographic 
composition. Besides geopolitical attitudes, 
a significant factor in possible elections is 
likely to be that the population of the 
NGCA is less qualified, older, poorer and in 
less good health than in the rest of Ukraine. 
Passportisation contributes to the socio-
demographic upheaval. 
Covid-19 Has Aggravated the 
Humanitarian Situation in 
the Donbas 
The Covid-19 pandemic has been slowing 
down passportisation. After a brief closure 
in mid-March, Russia kept its borders with 
the “People’s Republics” open, and its spe-
cial migration authorities continued to 
work. On 13 April 2020 the “People’s Re-
publics” stopped regular long-distance bus 
services from the NGCA to the Rostov 
region. The main delay in the whole pro-
cess of passportisation is the application 
for identity documents from the “People’s 
Republics”, which are required to prove 
residence. Nevertheless, despite the pan-
demic, passportisation is expected to con-
tinue – according to official figures, there 
is a backlog of around 98,000 passport 
applications. 
Since 23 March 2020, no passenger 
traffic has been possible across the contact 
line between the NGCAs and the GCAs. This 
has reduced the number of crossings from 
an average of 550,000 per month to a few 
hundred, and primarily affects people from 
the NGCAs who want to draw their pen-
sions, withdraw money, visit relatives, or 
deal with official business. The pandemic-
related isolation of the NGCAs has dramati-
cally worsened the humanitarian situation 
there. 
Outlook and Recommendations 
Russia achieves two main goals through its 
passportisation of the Donbas. By deliber-
ately torpedoing the Minsk peace process, 
it exerts permanent pressure on Ukraine. 
Without having to escalate militarily, it 
thus undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty. 
Moreover, the delay in conflict resolution 
contributes to making Russia comparatively 
more attractive as a country of emigration 
for Ukrainians. Russia’s demographic 
change must be considered a driver of its 
citizenship policy, alongside geopolitical 
motives. 
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Germany and the EU should insist on 
not recognising any passports issued on the 
basis of the decree of 24 April 2019. Care 
must be taken to ensure coherent imple-
mentation, since identifying the documents 
can be technically difficult and time-con-
suming in certain cases. Since non-recogni-
tion is only effective if it is consistently 
implemented and its causes are clearly com-
municated, close coordination between the 
EU consular departments in Russia will be 
necessary. 
With passportisation, Russia is also pur-
suing a symbolic policy, which has been 
accepted by parts of the civilian population 
in the Donbas because of the difficult 
humanitarian situation. Particularly be-
cause of the pandemic, the EU should make 
efforts to be perceived as a humanitarian 
actor by the civilian population in the 
Donbas. The EU should provide additional 
funding for humanitarian goods. At the 
same time, pressure is needed on Russia 
and the de-facto state structures to allow 
these goods in. The EU should also encour-
age Ukraine to implement existing plans 
to simplify crossing of the Line of Contact 
in the wake of the pandemic, to reduce 
bureaucracy in processing documents and 
using social assistance. The isolation of the 
NGCAs caused by Covid-19 is a massive 
factor in Ukraine’s alienation from them, 
which inevitably increases Russia’s 
influence. 
While the visa-free entry of Ukrainians 
into the EU is a success, the EU, as an im-
portant destination for labour migrants, 
is also contributing to population decline 
throughout Ukraine. To counteract this 
demographic crisis and its social conse-
quences, the EU should develop long-term 
strategies involving the NGCAs, for example 
in cooperation with the International Orga-
nisation for Migration. 
Finally, it should be remembered that in 
autumn 2019 Ukrainian President Zelensky 
set himself a deadline of one year for mak-
ing progress in the east of his country, and 
on several occasions referred to a “Plan B”. 
In the absence of alternatives, the Minsk 
process remains the only viable option. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering how 
a transition period could be inserted into 
the Minsk process before local elections are 
held. Basic prerequisites for elections are 
security and functioning institutions. These 
take time. After all, gerrymandering, en-
couraged by emigration and forced migra-
tion, has profoundly changed the electoral 
geography of Ukraine. 
Dr Fabian Burkhardt is a Research Fellow at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg. 
Before, he was an Associate in SWP's Eastern Europe and Eurasia division. 
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